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One of the major issues arising after a war is the demobilization of combatants who took part
in the armed conflict, whether it is a question of recruits drafted by their state or civilians
mobilized and armed in nonstate groups. This issue is of primary importance, due, in
particular, to the potentially destabilizing role ex-combatants might have vis-à-vis the peace
process, which explains why security is a constant concern during the different phases of
demobilization. Aside from military demobilization, carried out immediately after a war and
essentially a technical matter, there are other aspects of demobilization, namely cognitive
ones, which cannot easily be relegated to institutions, although they are essential to the
postconflict process in the long term.
Once combatants have been demobilized, the question of their future arises; demobilization is
often synonymous with return to civilian life, but it can also be achieved through the
integration of ex-combatants into new state security forces. In other words, the alternative is
between the “civilianization” of ex-combatants or the institutionalization of military experience
acquired outside the state. Thus, demobilization generally cannot be dissociated from reform
of the state security apparatus or from broader public policies aimed at favoring ex-
combatants’ return to civilian life, policies that thus contribute to the establishment of the
welfare state. In that sense, demobilization contributes to the (re)making of the state itself.
This entry further explores these aspects of demobilization, including security issues and
disarmament in the immediate postwar period, the phases of mil itary and cultural
demobilization, the reentry of ex-combatants to civilian life, and, finally, the formation of the
state.
A Security Issue for the Immediate Postwar Period
The works of historian Alec Campbell show that ever since Roman times, demobilization
phases have often been accompanied by political crises and struggles, owing notably to
claims that emerge or re-emerge after the war, when union against the enemy is no longer
necessary. In such circumstances, ex-combatants can play a decisive role. Their experience in
the war generally leads them to group together, apart from the working classes they
nonetheless issue from, and their political awareness is vague. In Europe, after World War I,
some of these “wild cards” allied themselves with the workers, others with the capitalists, yet
others with the nationalists. This is why for governments, one of the major issues of the
demobilization phase is to create conditions such that veterans will not swell the ranks of the
dissatisfied.
In the case of contemporary armed conflicts, 95% of which are intrastate, demobilization is
most often closely associated with the disarmament of combating groups with the aim of
preventing the spread of violence inherent in the creation of rebel fighting groups who
generally rose against the state. The goal of disarmament and demobilization policies is to put
an end to a situation symptomatic of the “failure” of certain states, incapable of successfully
claiming the monopoly on legitimate physical violence, to use Max Weber’s words. In
international relations, the collapse of such states is now considered one of the major factors
of insecurity and the reason why, more and more frequently, in the framework of
contemporary postconflicts, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs
for ex-combatants are solidly financed by international organizations (e.g., United Nations
Development Programme and the World Bank) wishing to maintain the Westphalian system of
state sovereignty.
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Military Demobilization and Cultural Demobilization
When war has involved conscripts, military demobilization—understood as the fact that
soldiers leave combat sites, most often to return to their civilian lives—is a huge bureaucratic
task that may last for months after the armistice, as was the case in France after World War I.
Such a task involves complex administrative undertakings, for example, the establishment of
nominative lists of demobilized men, the updating of military papers, medical appointments,
cantonment, allocation of indemnities, and the transport of soldiers to their homes. In the
context of contemporary intrastate armed conflicts, military demobilization is much more
informal and often imperfect, given that armed mobilization has not been organized under
state auspices or entailed much bureaucratic activity. As a result, because there is only an
approximate idea of the military arsenal or number of fighters, and the chains of command are
extremely loose, the surrender of arms is often only partial. (Many combatants only return
arms that are no longer usable, preferring to hold on to a means of defense in case combat
resumes.) Thus, the dismantling of armed groups can happen spontaneously or, if
combatants are not satisfied with the peace agreement, be a source of difficulty. Outside
actors working with international programs are usually powerless when faced with strategies
for circumventing and appropriating their disarmament and demobilization mechanisms. The
number of combatants who show up to benefit from the financial support of these
international programs is often much higher than any of the estimates, as these programs
offer a providential income in countries whose economies have been severely weakened.
In his analyses of World War I, Bruno Cabanes pointed out that demobilization involved three
phases: (1) the separation of the soldier from his “brothers in arms”; (2) the liminal phase,
when the former soldier, in limbo, forges a new identity; and (3) the reintegration phase, in
which he finds his place in economic life, in the framework of social rules and the daily life of
family and friendly relations. Demobilization is indeed not only a technical operation, and the
transition from military to civilian life has many dimensions (social and psychological in
particular), which explains why the transition is facilitated by the organization of certain rituals
of reintegration that ease the way into noncombating societies. Historian John Horne
emphasized that the re-establishment of peace meant, in particular, a cultural demobilization
—that is, the demobilization of the war cultures underlying the idealization of one’s own camp
and the corresponding demonization of the enemy. This cultural demobilization, which
contributes to humanizing the former enemy, now conceivable as a partner, is an
indispensable condition for any reconciliation process. Whereas military demobilization can be
relatively rapid, cultural demobilization operates in a different, longer temporality.
Return to Civilian Life or Consolidation of the Military Career
In the context of contemporary intrastate conflicts, peace agreements often stipulate a reform
of the security sector, based notably on the integration of ex-combatants into the armed forces
or the police. This can make it possible to settle conflicts, not only because it gives
satisfaction to veterans wanting to engage in a military career but also because it furthers their
allegiance to the state, thus favoring its legitimation or relegitimation. However, such
integration is not without its stumbling blocks because it makes for situations in which rebels
and loyalists coexist in the same institution, sometimes while the hostilities of the armed
conflict are still alive. In addition, involvement in intrastate groups has not always led
combatants to integrate principles of discipline or even give proof of serious military capacity—
both of which are indispensable to the functioning of a sovereign institution. All of this could
contribute to disorganizing the new security forces.
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However, the large majority of ex-combatants return to civilian life. Historians have
underscored the difficulties involved in this return to private life, due to the fact that often, the
war experience seems incommunicable. Thus sociability among veterans, particularly in an
associative framework, plays an essential role in their effort to give meaning to their war
experience and, at the same time, construct a memory of the armed conflict. Political science
research on contemporary conflict exits stresses the importance of reintegration programs
whose objective, after the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants, is civilianization,
to use the expression of Mats Berdal. Helping demobilized men to reintegrate to civilian life
means encouraging them to end all links they may have to former combatant groups and to
their military identity. However, for various reasons, this last part of DDR programs is rarely
well funded; it would mean investment in the medium or long term, unlike disarmament and
demobilization immediately after the war. It also involves multiple levels (economic, social, and
even psychological), whereas the preceding phases are strictly military. All of the
aforementioned factors underscore the essentially security-focused concept of these
postconflict mechanisms: The main objective of reintegration programs is to keep ex-
combatants busy, and they consist mainly in training offers not always adapted to an
impoverished postwar economy.
Demobilization and State Making
Charles Tilly showed clearly the link that exists between mobilizing combatants for the war
effort and the formation of the state. But one can also consider that link in connection with
demobilization. Demobilization affects state making when ex-combatants become its agents; it
then gives rise to a bureaucratic reconfiguration that resembles the reinforcing of the state in
wartime, through its efforts in conducting war. But demobilization contributes to state making
in another, more indirect sense: The claims usually put forth by ex-combatants after the war
often lead to the adoption of public policies to their advantage, and historically, this has
played a role in the genesis of the welfare state.
According to Theda Skocpol, in a country like the United States, where the development of
the state remained limited, ex-combatants were nevertheless at the origin of the introduction
of social welfare policy, due to the efficient lobbying of the Grand Army of the Republic
association, which demanded that pensions be granted to veterans of the Civil War. These
pensions constituted the keystone of U.S. social benefits between 1880 and 1910. Alec
Campbell shows that the formation of the American state after World War I is indebted to the
benefits system set up for demobilized men due to the Foreign Legion’s promotion of their
interests.
Besides granting specific benefits involved in material policy (e.g., pensions, advantages for
resuming studies, housing, and free medical care), after a war, the state is most often led to
introduce symbolic policies—mainly commemoration ceremonies—in answer to demands on
the part of veterans’ associations for recognition of “sacrifices made.” What is at stake in these
symbolic policies, which contribute to the establishment of a national narrative of the historical
foundations of the state and underscore the role of veterans in that process, is the very
refounding of the nation.
See alsoArmistice Day; Conscription and Mobilization of Soldiers; Disarmament; Nation
Building
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